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BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG
Reading Transcripts
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG is the Wallace and 
Beverley Woodbury University Professor at 
George Washington University School of Law 
in Washington, D.C. He is a past chair of 
the Criminal Justice Section and a regular 
columnist for Criminal Justice magazine. 
He is also author of the book, Trial Tactics, 
Third Edition (American Bar Association 2013), an updated 
and expanded compilation of his columns.
 TRiAL TAcTicS
When lawyers introduce transcripts into evi-dence, how can they make the contents clear, memorable, and persuasive to jurors? 
Do some approaches impermissibly “vouch” for the 
contents? These two questions can be addressed and 
answered in the context of a case in which the defen-
dant complained about the procedure utilized by the 
prosecution to highlight for a jury the contents of 
transcribed chat-room conversations.
United States v. Tragas: The Facts
The government brought numerous charges against 
Joanne Tragas as a result of her participation in an 
international credit and debit card fraud conspiracy. 
The case is reported at 727 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2013).
Tragas acted as a middleman between suppliers of 
stolen credit and debit card information who were 
overseas and street-level users of that information in 
the United States. Her overseas suppliers obtained 
and sold to her information typically encoded in the 
magnetic strip on the back of credit and debit cards. 
The transactions were accomplished using interna-
tional wire transfers. Tragas would take the stolen 
data and resell it to her coconspirators in the United 
States. Her customers used machines to encode the 
information obtained from Tragas on magnetic 
strips on blank plastic cards, which were then used 
as credit cards, gift cards, and hotel key cards. Once 
encoded, the counterfeit cards contained the very 
same information found on the legitimate cards.
Tragas’s customers could and did use the fraud-
ulent cards to purchase virtually whatever they 
wanted. They bought gift cards and high-end elec-
tronics, and they used the cards to get cash.
Two of Tragas’s best customers were twin broth-
ers, Dion and Dionte Hunter. They bought the 
stolen information from Tragas and either used it 
themselves or sold it to others. The investigation into 
the conspiracy revealed that the Hunters paid Tragas 
in several different ways: depositing money into her 
bank account, making wire transfers, and permitting 
her to use genuine gift cards that had been purchased 
through the use of the stolen credit card data that 
Tragas provided. Tragas never actually met in person 
with the Hunters, but they communicated frequently 
using online chat services and instant messaging. 
The Hunters kept records of these chat conversa-
tions stored on their laptop computer, and police 
discovered the messages in a search of the laptop.
The parties to the chat conversations did not use 
names, but the defendant’s picture was the “profile 
picture” associated with the instant message account 
holder who supplied the stolen information to the 
Hunters. The prosecution also had evidence that 
Tragas used the information supplied in chat con-
versations to make gift card purchases.
Tragas was convicted on every charge brought 
by the government: one count of conspiracy, seven 
counts of aiding and abetting unlawful activity under 
the Travel Act, one count of bank fraud, and two 
counts of wire fraud. The court of appeals affirmed 
her conviction but remanded for resentencing.
Reading the Transcripts
The government introduced transcripts of the chat 
conversations at trial. Once introduced, the prose-
cutor and a Secret Service agent read many of the 
conversations aloud to the jury. The prosecutor read 
aloud the statements attributable to Tragas, and the 
case agent read aloud the statements attributable to 
her coconspirators. At first, Tragas’s counsel did not 
object. But after several conversations were read, 
defense counsel objected on the ground that reading 
the transcripts aloud was cumulative, as the tran-
scripts themselves were already in evidence.
On appeal, Tragas argued that the reading of 
the transcripts denied her a fair trial. The court 
of appeals found it difficult to pin down the exact 
nature of her argument, but addressed several points 
on which the argument seemed to rest.
Hearsay. Tragas appeared to accept that there was 
no hearsay problem with the transcripts. Her state-
ments were admissible against her under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A), and the coconspirators’ 
statements were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
Theatrical performance. Tragas argued that by 
reading the transcripts aloud, the prosecutor and 
the case agent conducted a “theatrical performance” 
that was akin to a reenactment of  the chat con-
versations. She maintained that as a result of  this 
performance, the prosecution portrayed her written 
communications in a way that “telegraphed” to the 
jury that she was guilty.
The court responded that it could find no author-
ity for the proposition that reading aloud previously 
admitted documentary evidence is either improper 
or prejudicial. It cited two cases permitting the 
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practice: Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 
U.S. 250, 262–63 (1988) (finding no unfair preju-
dice where two IRS agents read in tandem from a 
transcript before a grand jury); and United States 
v. Chambers, 441 F.3d 438, 456–57 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(finding no unfair prejudice where a police officer 
read portions of  a defendant’s previously admit-
ted diary to the jury). The court rejected the notion 
that simply reading aloud what was contained in a 
writing amounted to an improper reenactment and 
concluded that reading properly admitted evidence 
to a jury was not unfairly prejudicial.
The court recognized that a problem could arise if  
a prosecutor attempted to stage a performance that 
strayed from the direct evidence introduced at trial 
or reflected the prosecutor’s opinions rather than 
the evidence. It found, however, that the prosecu-
tor and case agent attempted to read the transcripts 
accurately and that the minor discrepancies between 
what was read aloud and the transcripts were imma-
terial, especially in light of the fact that the jury had 
copies of the transcripts with which to follow along.
At one point, the court stated it appeared that 
Tragas’s principal argument, made in a variety of 
ways, was that merely by reading words aloud, the 
prosecutor and case agent “imbue[d] the evidence 
with some sort of magical power.” (Tragas, 727 F.3d 
at 615.) The court was unimpressed by the argument 
or Tragas’s assertion that the prosecutor and case 
agent engaged in a remarkable departure from tra-
ditional American practice.
Improper summary. Tragas argued that reading 
the transcripts aloud amounted to an impermissi-
ble overview or summary of the government’s case. 
The court responded that, while a defendant may 
be prejudiced if  a law enforcement officer is able 
to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence as 
an overview at the outset of a trial, the transcripts 
were admissible evidence, and neither the prosecutor 
nor the case agent appeared to summarize anything. 
They simply read the contents of properly admit-
ted documents.
Improper vouching. Tragas argued that the prose-
cutor’s reading of the chat conversations constituted 
improper vouching, which occurs when a prosecutor 
improperly indicates a personal belief  in the cred-
ibility of a witness and thereby places the prestige 
of the United States behind the witness. The court 
responded by pointing out that Tragas could not 
identify any comments or statements that could 
be construed as improper vouching or bolstering. 
Although the court did not make the point, it seems 
that the improper vouching argument was partic-
ularly inapt to the extent that the prosecutor was 
simply reading Tragas’s own statements. It is difficult 
to comprehend the complaint that the prosecutor 
was vouching for Tragas.
Confrontation violation. Tragas finally argued 
that, because the prosecutor is not a witness and 
cannot be cross-examined, any opinions, testimony, 
or interpretations of  evidence by the prosecutor 
are barred by the Sixth Amendment confrontation 
clause. Once again, the court declined to equate 
reading the transcripts with offering opinions or 
testimony and concluded that there was no confron-
tation problem.
Was There a Problem?
Is there something that courts should be concerned 
about in the way the prosecutor chose to present the 
chat conversation evidence to the jury in Tragas? 
The correct answer is a resounding “no,” and the 
reasons for this should be clear.
First, it is not unusual for lawyers to read the 
contents of documents to jurors. Lawyers do that 
all the time. In civil cases, they highlight words in 
contracts—sometimes by blowing them up so that 
they receive special emphasis, sometimes by read-
ing them aloud for emphasis, and at other times by 
doing both for extra emphasis. Lawyers frequently 
read e-mails aloud in both civil and criminal cases. 
Thus, an argument that it is improperly “theatrical” 
to read the contents of documents flies in the face 
of well-established practice.
Second, it is imperative that lawyers highlight 
the portions of documents upon which they want 
jurors to focus. This is necessary to ensure that jurors 
appreciate why documents have been put into evi-
dence, and that they have an adequate opportunity 
to become familiar with the contents. Few lawyers 
are content to simply offer documents into evidence 
with the hope or the assumption that the jury will 
read them at some time during the trial or delib-
erations. Some judges don’t send all exhibits into 
the jury room during deliberations, and, unless the 
contents of documents are called to the jury’s atten-
tion when they are introduced, the jury may never 
see the contents. Even if  documents are sent to the 
jury room, there is no assurance that all jurors will 
read them. In short, lawyers have a right and a need 
to put the contents of documents before the jury in 
a way that ensures that the jury comprehends the 
contents and is focused on the portions that coun-
sel believe are most significant.
Third, there is nothing in the law of evidence or in 
procedural rules that requires that only one person 
read from a document. It is not uncommon in civil 
cases for a lawyer and an assistant to read deposition 
testimony by having one person read the questions 
and another person read the answers. This actu-
ally highlights for a jury when a question or answer 
begins and ends. There is no reason why in a crimi-
nal case having a prosecutor and case agent do the 
same should be deemed prejudicial. The jury was 
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better able to follow the conversation and to dis-
tinguish Tragas’s statements from others’ with two 
people reading the statements than if  the prosecu-
tor alone read everything. That said, there might be 
a problem if  a prosecutor were to choose another 
reader who might have a special impact on a jury. 
Though unlikely to occur, if  a prosecutor were to 
have a famous actor, a former president, a popular 
elected official, or a respected religious leader join 
in reading aloud a transcript, a court might believe 
that the prosecutor was seeking an unfair advantage. 
This was not the case in Tragas.
Fourth, there is no restriction on a prosecutor or 
a defense counsel reading a document in a way that 
emphasizes certain words. The jury will see the docu-
ment as well as hear the reading, and can decide for 
itself  whether the document was read in a fair man-
ner. Moreover, despite Tragas’s attempts to prevent 
a prosecutor from “interpreting” evidence, prosecu-
tors and defense lawyers do this in every case as part 
of  closing argument. They ask the jury to accept 
their view of what evidence actually means. Thus, 
a prosecutor may tell the jury in closing that “we 
submit the defendant’s statement . . . meant that 
the defendant was agreeing to buy stolen credit card 
information,” while defense counsel may argue to 
the contrary that “we submit the defendant’s state-
ment had nothing to do with credit cards, stolen or 
legitimate.” It is permissible for both prosecutor and 
defense counsel to read during closing argument 
portions of admitted documents and to argue the 
meaning of what they read.
Fifth, far from being unfair, the reading of a doc-
ument by a prosecutor alone or by a prosecutor 
assisted by a case agent does something important 
for the defense: namely, it ensures that defense coun-
sel and the defendant know what has been read and 
what has been emphasized so that the defense is in 
a position to respond—by its own reading of doc-
uments or in closing argument. While jurors may 
read documents on their own and focus on parts 
not called to their attention by counsel, it is unlikely 
that jurors will pay more attention to the parts that 
have been ignored by the lawyers than to parts that 
have been emphasized.
Finally, there is nothing wrong with prosecu-
tors and defense counsel working to keep jurors 
interested in the presentation of evidence. Having 
a prosecutor or a defense counsel read a document 
to a jury in a monotone with no emphasis is likely 
to result in boredom or juror inattention or both. 
Having two people participate in reading a docu-
ment as in Tragas may do much to keep the jurors 
interested and attentive. That is to be applauded 
rather than condemned. n
